



## Eric Maskin

**AUTHOR · ECONOMIST · NOBEL PRIZE LAUREATE**

Most organisations set rules and incentives, then hope people behave as intended. They rarely do. When information is uneven, interests diverge, or a market structure rewards the wrong thing, the output is predictable: gamed auctions, misaligned pay, regulation that entrenches incumbents, decisions that no one in the room actually wants.

Eric Maskin is a Nobel laureate in economics whose work on mechanism design gives leaders a rigorous way to structure incentives, markets, and decision rules so that the outcomes people want are the outcomes the system produces.

### Eric Maskin's 2026 Biography

#### Why organisations work with Eric Maskin

- He is one of three economists who built the field that now underpins auction design, procurement, and market regulation across the developed world. Few speakers can claim intellectual authorship of a discipline their audience already uses.
- His frameworks answer a concrete question boards wrestle with: when an incentive system fails, is the fault in execution, in the people, or in the design itself? Maskin's work gives a disciplined way to tell the difference.
- On voting and collective decision rules, his recent work with Amartya Sen and Edward Foley offers leaders a sharper vocabulary for how groups should choose, directly relevant to governance, board process, and platform moderation.
- He brings the Harvard chair, the Nobel, and the former presidency of the Econometric Society, but speaks to business audiences in the register of a colleague reasoning through a problem, not a laureate delivering a lecture.

#### Biography highlights

- 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, shared with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson, for the foundations of mechanism design theory.
- Adams University Professor and Professor of Economics and Mathematics at Harvard University.
- Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 2000 to 2011.
- Past President of the Econometric Society and the Game Theory Society.
- Editor of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984 to 1990.

#### AVAILABLE FOR

- Panel Participation
- Speaking

#### ERIC'S SPEAKING THEMES

- Behavioural Economics
- Business Model Innovation
- Economic Trends & Global Markets
- Political Risk & Policy
- Risk Management

#### LANGUAGES: English

- Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and the National Academy of Sciences; holder of 18 honorary doctorates.

## Biography

Mechanism design is the branch of economics that asks a practical question: if you want a specific outcome from a group of people with different information and different interests, what rules will produce it? The Royal Swedish Academy cited that question when it awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to Leonid Hurwicz, Roger Myerson, and Eric Maskin.

Maskin's contribution, often called Maskin monotonicity, set the conditions under which a social goal can actually be implemented through the behaviour of self-interested agents. The theory now sits behind spectrum auctions, procurement design, matching markets, and a large share of modern regulatory economics.

His institutional record follows the work. He taught at MIT from 1977 to 1984, at Harvard from 1985 to 2000, and held the Albert O. Hirschman chair at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton until 2012, when Harvard named him Adams University Professor. He edited the Quarterly Journal of Economics for six years and served as President of both the Econometric Society and the Game Theory Society.

More recent work has turned to voting. With Amartya Sen in The New York Review of Books, and in subsequent papers with Edward Foley, Maskin has argued for Condorcet-style rules over plurality and ranked-choice systems on the grounds that they track majority preference more faithfully. For boards, regulators, and platform operators, the underlying question is the same as the one that won the Nobel: which rule produces the outcome the institution actually wants.

## Key speaking topics

- Mechanism design and the economics of incentives
- Auction design and market allocation
- Regulation, competition policy, and market power
- Voting rules and collective decision systems
- Governance and institutional design
- Innovation, patents, and intellectual property

## Ideal for

- Boards and executive committees redesigning incentive, compensation, or partnership structures
- Regulators, central banks, and policy leaders working on auctions, procurement, or market oversight
- Platform operators and market-makers setting allocation, pricing, or moderation rules
- Senior economics and strategy audiences at investor conferences and leadership summits

## Audience outcomes

- A working vocabulary for diagnosing when an incentive failure is a design problem, not a people problem
- Concrete examples of how auction and market-design choices change

who wins and what is produced

- A sharper view of voting and decision rules for governance, board process, and group choice
- Direct exposure to the reasoning of one of the architects of modern economic theory, applied to questions leaders actually face

## Eric Maskin's Videos

