Cybersécurité
Des experts qui aident les organisations à comprendre les menaces numériques, protéger les systèmes critiques et renforcer leur résilience
Speakers Associates represents 64 speakers on Cybersécurité, including Limor Ziv, Harriet Farlow, Saakshar Duggal, Marc Saltzman, Theresa Payton, Jim Sciutto, Susi O’Neill, Georgia Harrison, Nina Schick, et Sol Rashidi.
Most large organisations have run AI pilots. Few have turned them into operating advantage at scale. The hard problem sits between proof-of-concept and production: legacy estate, unclear governance, talent gaps, and a board that wants commercial outcomes rather than experiments.
AI systems are going into production faster than anyone is checking whether they can be attacked. A model can be poisoned during training or manipulated after deployment, and most security functions have no test for either. That risk sits between the data science team and the CISO, and neither owns it.
Most security programmes are built by defenders who have never run an intrusion end to end. The result is a set of controls that look complete on a slide and fail in the specific places an experienced attacker already knows how to find. Closing that gap requires an honest account of how hacker groups form, choose targets, and move through a network, told by someone who did it.
Boards are being asked to approve AI strategies they cannot evaluate. The architects of frontier systems openly say they do not fully understand what their models can do, yet executives are expected to deploy, govern and disclose around them. The shortfall is not technical literacy. It is a working theory of where the technology is heading and what that means for capital, headcount and liability.
Every board now owns cyber risk, but very few boards can read it. The attackers have industrialised, the attack surface has expanded into every connected device and vendor, and AI is widening the gap between what executives understand and what their defenders are actually facing. Leadership teams need someone who can make the threat concrete without making the room feel stupid.
Boards are now expected to have a view on AI, online manipulation and digital trust without having lived inside any of those worlds. The gap between what executives understand about the internet and what is actually happening on it has become a governance problem, not a technology problem. Most strategy documents treat that gap as a training issue. It is closer to a credibility issue.
Most leadership teams have an AI strategy that describes adoption. They do not have one that describes consequences. The systems being deployed across defence, finance, and healthcare are no longer tools that can be audited line by line, and the gap between what an executive can authorise and what the underlying technology actually does is widening month by month.
Most security failures do not start with a system. They start with a person being persuaded, distracted or trusted into letting an attacker through the door. Boards keep funding controls that assume the workforce is the strongest defence, when attackers treat it as the easiest route in.
Boards now have to price political risk into decisions they used to treat as commercial. Exposure to China, sanctions on Russia, supply routes through the Red Sea, and cyber operations from state actors are no longer separate files for a government affairs team. They land directly on the CFO, the general counsel, and the audit committee, and most leadership teams do not have a trusted source who is read in on what the U.S. national security community actually thinks is coming.
Boards are signing off on AI deployments faster than their organisations can govern them. Privacy, consent, and data lineage have moved from compliance topics to live commercial risks tied to model training, customer trust, and regulatory exposure. Most leadership teams have no shared language for deciding which uses of data are defensible and which are not.
Boards are being asked to price political risk into decisions they used to treat as commercial. Sanctions exposure, defence spending shifts, transatlantic friction and the unwinding of cheap globalisation now sit on the same agenda as capital allocation and operating strategy. Most leadership teams lack a reliable read on how policy decisions in Washington, Berlin and Brussels will land in their P and L.
Boards are pouring resources into AI and seeing thinner returns than promised. Regulatory scrutiny is rising in parallel. The two pressures converge at the same operational layer, and that is where most deployments quietly fail.