Globale Wirtschaft und Märkte
Experten, die die sich wandelnden Finanzmärkte, politische Entscheidungen und makroökonomische Kräfte analysieren und erklären
Speakers Associates represents 237 speakers on Globale Wirtschaft und Märkte, including Stephen Foerster, Lord Kim Darroch, Marcelo Carvalho, Elena Boheme, Jean Asselborn, Margarida Matos Rosa, Juliet Mann, Katie Prescott, Omar Christidis und Dan Walters.
Global supply chains are being rewritten under pressure from tariffs, geopolitical shocks, and cheaper industrial robots. Leadership teams that built a decade of margin on low-cost offshoring now face a harder question: which parts of the production network are still worth holding abroad, and which need to come back. Most boards are making that call on instinct, without the economic evidence to weight the trade-off.
Boards are being asked to make capital decisions in a world where the rules of globalisation no longer hold. Sanctions, supply-chain reorganisation, China exposure, energy transition costs and chronic political risk now sit on the same agenda as quarterly earnings. The leaders who get this right are the ones who can read the global economy as a single system, not a series of headlines.
Most growth playbooks were written for stable categories and forgiving capital. Today’s operators are scaling against tighter labour markets, harder unit economics and shorter windows to prove a model works. The hardest question for a founder or country manager is no longer how to grow; it is how to grow without breaking the system that made the first wins possible.
Companies with capital, customers, or supply chains in the Americas are being asked to price political risk they cannot read from the headlines. Migration flows, U.S.-Mexico tensions, shifting governments in Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia, and a harder U.S. posture on trade are rewriting the operating environment across the hemisphere. Boards need someone who has written U.S. policy from inside the room, not summarised it from outside.
California sets the rules that the rest of the United States and a sizable share of global business eventually has to comply with. Most leaders read the headlines and miss the machinery: which legislators move which bills, which lobbies win, which initiatives reach the ballot, which budget lines are real. That gap between reported politics and operating politics is where strategy goes wrong.
The rules governing global trade and investment were built for a world that no longer exists. Companies that structured supply chains, workforce strategies, and growth plans around open borders now face governments actively rewiring those rules. The tension is not between globalisation and its critics – it is between the legitimate demands of domestic politics and the logic of integrated markets, and most organisations are caught in the middle with no framework for navigating it.
Europe’s economic strategy is being rewritten in real time. Leaders have to price in fragmenting trade, a defense spending shock, Chinese industrial competition, and a euro architecture still missing pieces a generation after launch. The hard question is not what is changing, but which shifts are structural and which will pass.
Boards are making capital decisions inside the longest run of monetary distortion in modern history. Rates, currencies, commodity prices and sovereign risk no longer move in patterns that prior cycles taught leadership teams to read. The cost of misreading the macro is no longer a missed quarter, it is a misallocated decade.
Multinationals with exposure to Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the CIS and the wider MEA region are making capital and hiring decisions against a political backdrop that resets every quarter. Most corporate planning cycles are not built for that speed, and most regional leadership teams are left translating macro headlines into practical guidance for headquarters on their own. The question on the table is rarely what is happening; it is what to do about it next quarter.
Western boards are making consequential decisions about China – on supply chains, investment exposure, and strategic partnerships – based on assumptions about how China’s government thinks and acts that are frequently wrong. Official data on the Chinese economy routinely understates the scale of structural risks. The gap between how China sees its own economic model and how the West interprets it is not a communications problem. It is a governance and risk problem, with material consequences.
Food and agribusiness companies tend to operate within one part of the value chain – retail, manufacturing, production, or inputs – and make strategic decisions based on a partial view. Consumer preferences, retail power dynamics and sustainability pressures are all shifting simultaneously, and their effects travel in both directions along the chain. A business that reads only its own segment will consistently misread both the timing and the scale of what is coming.
The economic consensus that boards use to stress-test strategy has repeatedly failed at the moments it mattered most. Monetary instability, geopolitical fracture, and trade nationalism are precisely the forces that institutional forecasting tends to underestimate. Organisations that can read these structural dynamics before the consensus does consistently make better decisions at inflection points.