Gestion des risques
Des conférenciers qui aident les organisations à anticiper, naviguer et maîtriser les risques de la vie commerciale moderne
Speakers Associates represents 302 speakers on Gestion des risques, including Michael Lyon, Mark Stevenson, Olivier Sibony, Caroline Elliott, Limor Ziv, Harriet Farlow, Saakshar Duggal, Tina Stowell, Roger Spitz, et Stephen Foerster.
Boards are pricing geopolitical risk into decisions they used to make on commercial merit alone. The questions have shifted from scenario planning to alliance stability, sanctions exposure, supply routes, and defence budgets feeding back into industrial policy. Leaders need someone who has sat in the room when these calls get made, not a commentator reading the same wires they are.
Senior leaders rehearse crisis plans they hope never to use. The harder problem is the one most preparation skips: how a small team makes consequential decisions when information is incomplete, the environment is hostile, and the consequences of getting it wrong are immediate. Most boards have no reference point for what that actually feels like, or how composure under that pressure is built rather than assumed.
In high-hazard operating environments, errors are inevitable. The question for senior leaders is not how to eliminate them, it is how to build teams that catch errors early, recover quickly, and learn fast enough that the next incident does not look like the last one. Most organisations chase zero-incident targets and then punish the people closest to the work when those targets slip, which is precisely how reliable teams stop reporting near misses.
Boards are being asked to approve AI strategies they cannot evaluate. The architects of frontier systems openly say they do not fully understand what their models can do, yet executives are expected to deploy, govern and disclose around them. The shortfall is not technical literacy. It is a working theory of where the technology is heading and what that means for capital, headcount and liability.
Boards are making capital decisions inside an economy whose operating logic has changed. Inflation, sanctions, industrial policy, and rising inequality now drive returns more than productivity gains or balance sheets. Leaders need an economist who can read the political economy underneath the numbers and tell them what is structural and what is cyclical.
Every board now owns cyber risk, but very few boards can read it. The attackers have industrialised, the attack surface has expanded into every connected device and vendor, and AI is widening the gap between what executives understand and what their defenders are actually facing. Leadership teams need someone who can make the threat concrete without making the room feel stupid.
Boards and executive teams are being asked to price political risk that now moves faster than their planning cycles. Wars, sanctions, information operations and shifting alliances are no longer background noise. They reshape supply chains, capital flows and reputational exposure inside a single quarter, and most leadership teams lack a direct line to people who have sat in the room when those decisions were taken.
Boards are now expected to have a view on AI, online manipulation and digital trust without having lived inside any of those worlds. The gap between what executives understand about the internet and what is actually happening on it has become a governance problem, not a technology problem. Most strategy documents treat that gap as a training issue. It is closer to a credibility issue.
Most leadership teams have an AI strategy that describes adoption. They do not have one that describes consequences. The systems being deployed across defence, finance, and healthcare are no longer tools that can be audited line by line, and the gap between what an executive can authorise and what the underlying technology actually does is widening month by month.
Building a winning culture in an organisation that has lost its edge is harder than building one from scratch. The incumbent leadership style, the entrenched rivalries, the inherited talent, and the public expectation of decline all work against change. Senior leaders charged with turning a serious institution back into a serious competitor need an operating model that treats people, process, and political pressure as a single problem.
Most security failures do not start with a system. They start with a person being persuaded, distracted or trusted into letting an attacker through the door. Boards keep funding controls that assume the workforce is the strongest defence, when attackers treat it as the easiest route in.
Inflation, fragmented monetary regimes, and rising public debt are no longer background conditions. They shape pricing, capital cost, and the credibility of every long-horizon decision a board makes. Leaders need someone who has sat inside the institutions setting those conditions, not a commentator translating them from outside.