Geopolitics speakers
Analysts and former diplomats who decode shifting global power dynamics, alliances, and the forces redrawing the world map
Speakers Associates represents 276 speakers on Geopolitics, including Nikolas Badminton, Caspar Veldkamp, Dominic Sandbrook, Federica Mogherini, Paolo Petrocelli, Lord Kim Darroch, Dame Wendy Hall, Marcelo Carvalho, Elena Boheme and Stefan Löfven.
Boards are making capital decisions in an environment where rate paths, inflation, and currency moves no longer follow the post-2008 script. The cost of getting the macro call wrong has risen, but most organisations do not have a credible internal economist to challenge consensus forecasts. Leadership teams need a translator who can turn central bank signals and economic data into specific implications for pricing, hedging, hiring, and investment.
Boards now treat Russia and the wider authoritarian bloc as a permanent feature of their risk register, not a passing event. The hard question is not what is happening, but what the regime is likely to do next, and on what timeline. Most strategic intelligence reaching senior leaders is filtered through analysts who have never lived under the system they are describing.
Boards are being asked to price political risk that no longer behaves as it used to. Sanctions regimes shift, alliances strain, energy supply is contested, and a single foreign policy decision can rewrite a five-year capital plan. Most leadership teams lack a credible voice in the room who has seen great-power conflict from the operational level and can talk through what is actually decided, by whom, and how fast.
Boards keep being told the rules of the global economy have changed. They are not always told which rules, in what order, and what to do about it. The gap between everyday political-economic noise and the structural shifts that actually move capital, regulation and competitive position is where senior decisions are now being made badly.
Boards making capital decisions tied to China are working from headlines, not from a clear read of how Beijing’s policy machinery actually moves. The result is exposure managed by sentiment rather than structural understanding. The cost of misreading the relationship between US monetary policy, Chinese reform, and supply chain reality is now sitting on balance sheets.
China’s large holders of dollar-denominated assets and organisations pricing China exposure are working from risk models calibrated to Western consensus, not to what Beijing’s own economists actually argue. The structural vulnerabilities inside China’s monetary framework – negative real returns on foreign reserves, a demand shortfall, an exchange rate regime under persistent strain – are actively debated inside Chinese policy institutions but rarely surface with precision in Western boardrooms. The gap between what circulates in Beijing and what informs institutional risk decisions in London, New York, or Singapore is a direct source of mispriced exposure.
Climate ambition, fiscal pressure and geopolitical realignment are arriving at the same desk. Boards and policymakers need leaders who have actually delivered carbon reduction, fiscal reform and crisis response inside a major economy, not commentators describing the problem from outside it. The gap is rarely strategy; it is the operating discipline to convert policy into results at scale.
Power over information has always determined geopolitical order. AI is the first information technology that does not require human instruction to generate, spread, or act on what it knows. Corporate, governmental, and international institutions built to govern information flows were designed for an earlier kind of network. Most are struggling to close that gap in real time.
When macro forces – interest rates, trade policy, geopolitical realignment, energy transition – were relatively stable and separable, organisations could treat global economics as background context. That is no longer tenable. The dollar’s trajectory, a shift in U.S. trade posture, or a fracture in the multilateral system can restructure competitive dynamics within a quarter, and the executives responsible for strategy often lack the analytical vocabulary to distinguish signal from noise. The real problem is not access to information. It is the capacity to integrate political, economic, and institutional forces into decisions that were never designed to hold that complexity.
Boards are making capital and supply-chain decisions on China with information that is mostly second-hand. Western commentary swings between bull and bear without sitting close enough to Beijing’s policy apparatus to read where it is actually heading. The cost of getting that read wrong now shows up in investment committee minutes, not academic papers.