Planification de scénarios et prospective stratégique
Des intervenants qui aident les organisations à anticiper l’incertitude, tester leurs hypothèses et planifier plusieurs futurs possibles
Speakers Associates represents 255 speakers on Planification de scénarios et prospective stratégique, including Kemal Apaydin, Peter Fisk, Mark Stevenson, Olivier Sibony, Thimon de Jong, Lucy Bullivant, Rita McGrath, Katja Schipperheijn, Graeme Codrington, et Dean van Leeuwen.
Market reform in emerging economies almost always eventually reverses – but not randomly. Concentrated power, state mercantilism, and institutional capture outlast any individual government, and any single investment thesis. Executive teams that price geopolitical risk on the political cycle, rather than on structural conditions, systematically misread their exposure.
Strategy cycles run on three-year horizons. The technologies reshaping markets operate on ten-year ones. Without a methodology for reading early-stage signals, organisations discover the future after competitors have already acted on it.
The rules-based international order that underpins global investment, trade, and energy supply is under structural – not cyclical – pressure. Boards and executive teams are making long-horizon capital decisions inside a framework of institutions and agreements that is actively being contested. Geopolitics is no longer a variable to brief around; it is the operating environment.
Leaders now have access to more knowledge than at any point in history – and less clarity about what to do with it. Most strategic frameworks for navigating AI and exponential technology were designed for a world that no longer exists. The gap is not information; it is understanding: the capacity to anticipate what comes next, make decisions with philosophical coherence, and preserve human agency in organisations that are accelerating faster than their leadership thinking can follow.
Global economic decisions are increasingly political – and the gap between what institutions say and what governments can actually deliver is where business risk lives. Boards that treat fiscal policy as a technical backdrop miss the real question: who holds power, what constraints they face, and how those constraints shape the economic environment their organisations operate in. The difference between a credible fiscal framework and a fragile one does not announce itself in advance.
Boards know UK politics now moves faster than corporate planning cycles. Election outcomes, fiscal reversals, regulatory shifts, and the state’s relationship with business are changing the assumptions inside long-range plans. Leaders need a credible reading of where Westminster, Whitehall and the British economy are actually heading, not a partisan one.
The executives now setting strategy on China exposure, Ukraine risk, and defence-adjacent supply chains face a specific problem: information is abundant, but interpretive depth is rare. Geopolitical events do not announce whether they represent structural shifts or temporary disruption. That distinction requires statecraft literacy of a kind most organisations have never had to develop before.
Most planning tools were designed for a world that no longer exists. Strategy cycles built for predictable horizons break down when disruption compounds across technology, geopolitics, and social change at once, producing false confidence rather than genuine foresight. Organisations that cannot distinguish structural change from noise will always be reacting to a future someone else shaped.
Most multinationals entered emerging markets with frameworks designed for a Western-centric, unipolar world. China and India do not reward that approach. Organisations competing across these markets face a different set of rules on innovation cycles, consumer structure, regulatory logic, and the nature of local rivals that standard global strategy models consistently fail to capture. Turning geographic presence into competitive advantage requires something more precise than market entry playbooks.
Most organisations overestimate risk in markets they do not understand and underestimate opportunity in ones they have already written off. The problem is not missing data – experienced leaders tend to hold shared, systematically incorrect assumptions about how the world has developed. When those assumptions go unexamined in strategy sessions, they shape investment, market entry, and risk decisions in ways that better analysis alone cannot fix.
Most executive teams can identify the trends shaping their sector. Very few have a system for deciding which ones require a strategic response. The gap between broad trend awareness and structured foresight is where long-term planning quietly fails – and where competitors with better methodology gain ground.
Most boards still treat AI, automation and connected mobility as a technology programme. The harder question is what they do to the operating model, the workforce, the customer relationship, and the social contract a company sits inside. Leaders need a way to think about exponential change that is sharper than scenario decks and more useful than another keynote about disruption.