Geopolitics
Analysts and former diplomats who decode shifting global power dynamics, alliances, and the forces redrawing the world map
Boards are being asked to commit capital to decarbonisation plans whose economics still do not close. Power markets were built for a different era, hydrogen contracts have no settled template, and the gap between political targets and investable projects keeps widening. Leaders need a clear read on which parts of the energy transition actually pay, which do not yet, and where policy is about to move the line.
Most organisations can gather data on customer behaviour. Far fewer can explain why it is changing – or what it will demand of their brand in three years. Sociocultural shifts, from generational realignment to the psychological fallout of sustained economic pressure, are reshaping what customers trust, what employees expect, and what growth models can still hold. Organisations that mistake these shifts for short-term noise are making strategic decisions on a map that no longer matches the terrain.
Boards now have to make capital-allocation calls inside an economy where monetary policy, fiscal stress and political fracture move together. Most leadership teams can read the headlines but cannot trace how a central-bank decision in Frankfurt, a fiscal rule in Brussels and a war on Europe’s eastern border end up reshaping their cost of capital. The gap is not data. It is judgement from someone who has sat on the other side of those decisions.
European boards no longer treat Brussels as background noise. EU budget priorities, sanctions architecture, and the politics of enlargement now shape capital decisions across the continent. Reading those signals correctly, and understanding how Polish and Central European interests will move within them, requires someone who has worked inside the machinery.
Boards with European exposure are operating in a security environment that has not existed since the Cold War. The eastern flank of NATO is no longer a map feature, it is a live variable that shapes energy costs, supply routes, capital flows, and political risk across the continent. Leaders want a view from inside the countries that have been living with this reality for decades, not commentary from the outside.
Boards are being asked to price political risk that no longer behaves as it used to. Sanctions regimes shift, alliances strain, energy supply is contested, and a single foreign policy decision can rewrite a five-year capital plan. Most leadership teams lack a credible voice in the room who has seen great-power conflict from the operational level and can talk through what is actually decided, by whom, and how fast.
Inflation, fragmented monetary regimes, and rising public debt are no longer background conditions. They shape pricing, capital cost, and the credibility of every long-horizon decision a board makes. Leaders need someone who has sat inside the institutions setting those conditions, not a commentator translating them from outside.
Most senior leadership convenings rise or fall on the chair. When the moderator cannot challenge a former head of state or unstick a CEO mid-answer, the conversation defaults to prepared remarks. The audience leaves with very little they could not have read in a press release.
Technology decisions no longer sit inside the technology function. The next decade of corporate strategy will be shaped by state power, capital flows and public backlash as much as by product roadmaps, and leadership teams are being asked to read all of these at once. Most boards can price a competitor. Far fewer can price a government, a regulator and a public mood moving against them at the same time.
European security is no longer a background condition for business strategy – it has become a primary variable in board-level decisions about investment, supply chains, and market access. Most organisations carry geopolitical exposure they cannot yet map: to shifting NATO commitments, to the long-term arc of the Russia-Ukraine war, and to a transatlantic relationship under structural strain. The analytical frameworks that served risk functions in a stable order are no longer adequate.
Most boards now treat China as a first-order commercial and political risk, but the intelligence reaching them is thin, often filtered through analysts who have never lived there. Leaders need someone who can translate Beijing’s signals, from Party statements to economic policy, into decisions about supply chains, market exposure, and talent. They also need a sober read on what a more contested US-China relationship actually changes for the next five years.