Planificación de escenarios y previsión estratégica speakers
Oradores que ayudan a las organizaciones a anticipar la incertidumbre, validar supuestos y planificar múltiples futuros
Speakers Associates represents 255 speakers on Planificación de escenarios y previsión estratégica, including Kemal Apaydin, Peter Fisk, Mark Stevenson, Olivier Sibony, Thimon de Jong, Lucy Bullivant, Rita McGrath, Katja Schipperheijn, Graeme Codrington y Dean van Leeuwen.
Organisations are still optimising for metrics that conceal the costs they are actually creating. GDP-linked targets and quarterly profit tell boards very little about regulatory exposure, inequality risk, or structural instability. The economic assumptions that once provided strategic cover are becoming political liabilities – and the frameworks used to replace them are still being contested.
AI investment is running ahead of any defensible view of what the workforce, the operating model, or the regulatory environment will actually look like in five years. Most boards are committing capital to technology decisions without a method for thinking systematically about the futures those decisions produce. Foresight is treated as a creative exercise, not a discipline.
Sustainable competitive advantage has stopped behaving like it used to. Incumbents with strong positions, talent, and capital still lose share to entrants who reframe the question rather than win on the answer. The work is no longer protecting a moat; it is detecting where the moat has already moved.
Uncertainty is now the steady state, and most leadership teams are still managing it as a temporary disruption. Composure, judgement and the willingness to commit are degrading under that load, and the cost shows up in slower decisions, narrower thinking and quiet disengagement. The question is no longer how to remove uncertainty from the operating environment, but how to make the people running the business measurably better at working inside it.
The more an organisation automates, the more it depends on the one thing models cannot do: catch the risk that does not fit the data. Every serious failure starts as a small anomaly a team talks itself out of, long before it reaches a dashboard. The advantage now belongs to whoever sees the fault line while it is still just a detail that does not fit.
AI now makes decisions that once belonged to people, and it is absorbing more of the work. Leaders still have to keep human judgement and accountability in place while that happens. Most operating models were built for stability, and offer no map for the ground between what worked before and what comes next.
Autonomous AI agents have started acting on people’s behalf, sending messages, booking, buying, and making decisions without a human in the loop. Organisations now have to decide how much of that autonomy to hand over, and who answers for it when an agent gets something wrong. The technology is moving faster than the controls and oversight meant to govern it.
Western organisations built their strategies on assumptions – about US primacy, open multilateralism, and a rules-based order – that are now visibly fracturing. The US-China contest is not a temporary disruption; it is restructuring trade flows, technology standards, institutional loyalties, and investment calculus simultaneously. Most leadership teams are making consequential decisions about market exposure, supply chain architecture, and geopolitical alignment without a working model of how the shift actually operates.
Strategy built for national markets and capital-intensive competition is now a liability, not a framework. Urbanisation, the feminisation of skilled workforces, and the structural erosion of imitation as viable strategy have redrawn the competitive map. The organisations that grasp this shift first will set the terms of the next era of competition – not manage its consequences.
Boards and investment committees are making capital decisions on geopolitical assumptions that no longer hold. The categories most institutions still use to assess country risk and global exposure were built for a system that is fracturing. Misreading the new map costs capital and market position.
Boards that depend on Russia, the Baltics, or the wider post-Soviet space need more than headline analysis. They need someone who has worked inside Russian newsrooms, sat across the table from the Kremlin as a Western corporate, and still files weekly from outside the country. The gap between sanctioned narratives and operating reality is where bad decisions happen.