Liderança em Crises
Especialistas que ajudam as organizações a manter-se operacionais, resilientes e confiantes perante perturbações inesperadas
Speakers Associates represents 100 speakers on Liderança em Crises, including Michael Lyon, Caroline Elliott, Bonnie Crombie, Jim Sciutto, Scott Tillema, Oswald Rodrigo Pereira, Libby Jackson, Nicholas Hopton, Thomas Kolditz e Alison Levine.
European security is no longer a background condition for business strategy – it has become a primary variable in board-level decisions about investment, supply chains, and market access. Most organisations carry geopolitical exposure they cannot yet map: to shifting NATO commitments, to the long-term arc of the Russia-Ukraine war, and to a transatlantic relationship under structural strain. The analytical frameworks that served risk functions in a stable order are no longer adequate.
Most boards still treat cyber security as a control function, owned by IT, reviewed quarterly, signed off through a risk register. The people actually breaking into banks and government buildings know that the organisation’s real exposure is rarely in the firewall configuration. It is in the receptionist who holds the door, the contractor badge that nobody checks, and the gap between the security policy on paper and the behaviour on the floor.
Boards are being asked to make capital, supply chain and people decisions against a threat map that now includes state conflict, proxy terrorism, cyber and energy shocks in parallel. The intelligence that used to sit with governments is now a commercial risk input, and most executive teams are not wired to read it. The gap is between headline awareness and a working view of what a given event means for this business, this quarter.
Most boards still treat cybersecurity as a compliance line item managed by the CISO. The attackers do not. They move faster than procurement cycles, exploit the gap between IT controls and human behaviour, and turn ransomware into an operating crisis within hours. Leadership teams need a sharper feel for how attackers actually work, not another framework.
Senior leaders are being asked to hold their nerve in situations their training did not prepare them for: compressed decisions, hostile audiences, physical and reputational risk running at the same time. Composure under that load is not a personality trait. It is a set of habits around attention, communication and trust that can be taught by people who have had to use them.
Most security programmes are built by defenders who have never run an intrusion end to end. The result is a set of controls that look complete on a slide and fail in the specific places an experienced attacker already knows how to find. Closing that gap requires an honest account of how hacker groups form, choose targets, and move through a network, told by someone who did it.
Political decisions now move markets, reshape trade relationships, and disrupt supply chains within a single news cycle. Most leadership teams have access to the same headlines. What they lack is the structured interpretation to act on them – the ability to separate a durable shift from a temporary disruption, and to map political events onto specific operational and strategic exposure. The gap between information and decision has become one of the more costly problems in senior leadership.
Boards now treat geopolitical risk as a recurring agenda item, but most still rely on desk research filtered through several layers of analysis. The decisions that matter, China exposure, supply-chain rerouting, sanctions, security of overseas personnel, depend on understanding how power actually behaves on the ground in fractured states. The gap between official briefings and operational reality is where credibility, and capital, gets lost.
Leaders know how to run the organisation on a good week. Far fewer know who they become when the structure around them collapses, the information is wrong, and the timeline is someone else’s. What holds a leader together under sustained pressure is not strategy. It is a set of inner commitments that most executives have never been forced to define.
Most organisations do not lack talent. They lack a shared, repeatable way to brief a plan, execute it under pressure, and debrief it honestly enough to close the gap the next time. When the cost of error is high and the tempo is fast, that missing discipline is what separates a team that performs once from a team that performs consistently.
Senior leaders rehearse crisis plans they hope never to use. The harder problem is the one most preparation skips: how a small team makes consequential decisions when information is incomplete, the environment is hostile, and the consequences of getting it wrong are immediate. Most boards have no reference point for what that actually feels like, or how composure under that pressure is built rather than assumed.
In high-hazard operating environments, errors are inevitable. The question for senior leaders is not how to eliminate them, it is how to build teams that catch errors early, recover quickly, and learn fast enough that the next incident does not look like the last one. Most organisations chase zero-incident targets and then punish the people closest to the work when those targets slip, which is precisely how reliable teams stop reporting near misses.