Scenarioplanering och strategisk framtidsanalys
Talare som hjälper organisationer att förutse osäkerhet, testa antaganden och planera för flera möjliga framtider
Speakers Associates represents 255 speakers on Scenarioplanering och strategisk framtidsanalys, including Kemal Apaydin, Peter Fisk, Mark Stevenson, Olivier Sibony, Thimon de Jong, Lucy Bullivant, Rita McGrath, Katja Schipperheijn, Graeme Codrington och Dean van Leeuwen.
Global supply chains are being rewritten under pressure from tariffs, geopolitical shocks, and cheaper industrial robots. Leadership teams that built a decade of margin on low-cost offshoring now face a harder question: which parts of the production network are still worth holding abroad, and which need to come back. Most boards are making that call on instinct, without the economic evidence to weight the trade-off.
Most strategy processes treat the future as uncertain and respond by hedging. That posture costs time and investment while competitors move on signals that were knowable in advance. Leadership teams need a disciplined way to separate the parts of the future that are already decided from the parts that are still open, and to act on each differently.
Western boards are making consequential decisions about China – on supply chains, investment exposure, and strategic partnerships – based on assumptions about how China’s government thinks and acts that are frequently wrong. Official data on the Chinese economy routinely understates the scale of structural risks. The gap between how China sees its own economic model and how the West interprets it is not a communications problem. It is a governance and risk problem, with material consequences.
Customer expectations don’t shift gradually – they reset when a leading business makes a move that becomes the new standard. Most organisations track their own customers too closely and the forces reshaping those customers not closely enough. The arrival of AI has made the problem acute: more signals, faster change, and a greater penalty for placing bets on the wrong ones.
The economic consensus that boards use to stress-test strategy has repeatedly failed at the moments it mattered most. Monetary instability, geopolitical fracture, and trade nationalism are precisely the forces that institutional forecasting tends to underestimate. Organisations that can read these structural dynamics before the consensus does consistently make better decisions at inflection points.
Most organisations can name the technologies disrupting their sector. Few have leadership frameworks capable of responding at the speed those technologies actually move. The gap is not strategic awareness – it is the absence of a decision-making model built for exponential change rather than incremental adjustment. Organisations that cannot distinguish truly disruptive technologies from merely revolutionary ones will continue making that call by instinct – and that instinct was calibrated for a slower world.
Data presented without its uncertainty is a form of misrepresentation – and most organisations do it routinely. When leaders strip out confidence intervals or present probabilistic forecasts as settled conclusions, they create the appearance of clarity while compounding real risk. Boards that cannot interrogate the evidence behind a risk figure are making high-stakes decisions on grounds that have been quietly misrepresented.
Most Western boards are still reading Asia through a US-China lens. The biggest commercial repricing of the next two decades is happening on a different axis: along the capital, supply chain and political corridor connecting the Greater Bay Area, Hong Kong, ASEAN, and Australia and New Zealand. Strategy on that corridor is being set today, and most senior teams are working from maps that no longer describe the room they are actually in.
Most technology products fail not because the technology stops working, but because people won’t use them. Organisations pour investment into building capability and almost nothing into understanding adoption. The psychology of why users reject genuinely useful innovations is a problem most corporate innovation teams are not equipped to see – let alone solve.
Most leaders are selected and rewarded for having answers. The pressure to project certainty does not disappear when a challenge is genuinely complex – it intensifies. Most leadership development treats uncertainty as a problem to be managed rather than a condition to be led through. The capability that matters most in those moments is rarely built.
Boards built their growth strategies for a world that no longer exists. The China relationship is now a board-level risk, supply chains have to be re-engineered around political fault lines, and reputation in one capital can damage the licence to operate in another. Decisions taken with last decade’s mental model now produce the wrong answers faster than ever.