Economic Trends & Global Markets speakers
Economists and analysts who decode shifting financial landscapes, policy moves and macroeconomic forces
Speakers Associates represents 237 speakers on Economic Trends & Global Markets, including Stephen Foerster, Lord Kim Darroch, Marcelo Carvalho, Elena Boheme, Jean Asselborn, Margarida Matos Rosa, Juliet Mann, Katie Prescott, Omar Christidis and Dan Walters.
When markets move, central banks act or a corporate institution comes under scrutiny, most leadership teams are entirely dependent on how journalists frame events – with little insight into the gap between what is actually happening and what gets reported. At the same time, the economics of any major decision – rates, inflation, sector stress, geopolitical pressure on supply and capital – are growing more complex, more politically charged, and harder to read from the outside. The question is not simply what is happening, but who is shaping the narrative, how, and what that means for decisions made in the boardroom.
The events that now move the most value in international business, elections, conflicts, regulatory shifts across Asia and the Middle East, are usually covered by people outside those regions. Finding a host who has filed from Swat, anchored from Doha, and knows the FTSE 100 brand brief as well as the geopolitical one is not straightforward. For events that sit at the intersection of global business and hard-edge news, the pool of credible hosts thins out very quickly.
Most organisations announce a position on inclusion long before they have a working theory of how to embed it. Internal champions then have to convert generic commitments into hiring decisions, promotion patterns and product choices, often in front of a workforce that has heard the rhetoric before. The hard task is making inclusion visible as operating discipline, not statement.
Boards talk fluently about strategy and policy, then watch the room glaze over the moment a customer, an apprentice or a frontline manager joins the conversation. The gap between what executives say and what employees, customers and small suppliers hear is widening. Closing it takes someone who can interrogate a CFO and translate the answer for a warehouse floor without losing either side.
The forty-year operating model is over. Boards built strategies, supply chains, and growth assumptions around open markets, China access, and a single global capital pool, and that world has fractured into rival blocs with their own rules. Leaders now need a working theory of competitiveness that survives sanctions, industrial policy, and bloc-level alignment, not a set of slides about uncertainty.
Most leadership teams receive the same economic data as their competitors. What separates them is the ability to read what it actually means for capital allocation, supply chain exposure, and market positioning – before consensus has formed. Trade policy reversals, central bank divergence, and geopolitical fracture are no longer background conditions. They arrive as direct operational problems, and the cost of misreading them has risen sharply.
Capital allocation decisions sit at the centre of every senior leadership agenda. Yet the boards and committees making them are rarely staffed by finance specialists. The frameworks they inherit were built decades ago, and the assumptions inside them still shape how institutions measure investment risk today.
Strategic decisions about supply chains, capital allocation, and technology partnerships increasingly rest on assumptions about the US-China relationship that neither side has rigorously examined. Most organisations treat the conflict as a permanent, structurally determined condition – and make significant, often irreversible bets on decoupling, reshoring, or geopolitical alignment on that basis. The harder question – whether the conflict is actually driven by what the prevailing narrative says it is, and whether the forces sustaining it are as immovable as they appear – rarely gets the same rigour as the operational response.
The geopolitical landscape that shapes business strategy, regulatory exposure, and reputational risk is increasingly opaque, defined by leaders who are rarely held to account in structured, adversarial terms, and by information environments that reward noise over clarity. Boards and executive teams are expected to form views on geopolitical dynamics, from democratic backsliding and great-power competition to the erosion of institutional credibility, without the tools to distinguish well-constructed analysis from well-packaged opinion. The question is not whether geopolitics matters to business, but whether organisations can build the interpretive rigour to act on it with confidence.
Senior leaders are under pressure to make high-stakes decisions in conditions where the available information is abundant, contested, and heavily distorted by media cycles and cognitive shortcuts. Yet the tools required to reason well under uncertainty – probability, causal inference, evidence evaluation – are rarely taught and even more rarely applied systematically inside organisations. The result is that even experienced executives and boards make decisions shaped more by availability bias, narrative pull, and institutional momentum than by the evidence in front of them.