Scenario Planning & Strategic Foresight speakers
Speakers who help organisations anticipate uncertainty, stress-test assumptions and plan for multiple futures
Speakers Associates represents 257 speakers on Scenario Planning & Strategic Foresight, including Michael Beckley, Kemal Apaydin, Peter Fisk, Mark Stevenson, Olivier Sibony, Thimon de Jong, Lucy Bullivant, Rita McGrath, Katja Schipperheijn and Graeme Codrington.
Most organisations can describe what they do and explain how they do it. Few can articulate with conviction why they exist. And the absence of that clarity is not a communications problem; it is an organisational one, visible in disengagement, misalignment, and cultures where people comply rather than commit. Compound this with leaders who are structurally incentivised to play a short-term, finite game – optimising against competitors, quarters, and KPIs – and you get organisations that are technically functional but quietly haemorrhaging the trust, purpose, and psychological safety that sustain performance over the long run.
Most leadership teams plan for a future that resembles the recent past. Then AI, climate volatility, and geopolitical fracture arrive at once, and the plan does not survive the first quarter. The question is no longer how to predict the next disruption, but how to build an organisation whose reflexes are tuned to operate when prediction fails.
Boards are operating inside a security and trade order that no longer behaves as it did. Sanctions regimes, supply exposure, and great-power friction now sit on the executive agenda, yet most leadership teams have no first-hand reference for how governments actually decide under that pressure. The gap between corporate scenario decks and the rooms where these decisions get made has rarely been wider.
The forty-year operating model is over. Boards built strategies, supply chains, and growth assumptions around open markets, China access, and a single global capital pool, and that world has fractured into rival blocs with their own rules. Leaders now need a working theory of competitiveness that survives sanctions, industrial policy, and bloc-level alignment, not a set of slides about uncertainty.
Most organisations optimise for the next twelve months. Most investors optimise for the next quarter. The discipline of allocating capital, attention and structure so that value compounds over decades is a capability few senior teams have built, and one that increasingly separates the businesses that endure from those that do not.
Most leadership teams receive the same economic data as their competitors. What separates them is the ability to read what it actually means for capital allocation, supply chain exposure, and market positioning – before consensus has formed. Trade policy reversals, central bank divergence, and geopolitical fracture are no longer background conditions. They arrive as direct operational problems, and the cost of misreading them has risen sharply.
Most organisations are built to sell products that already exist to customers who already know they want them. The harder problem is the one a new category faces: persuading high-trust, high-net-worth customers to commit money, time and reputation to something that has never been done, and to keep them engaged through repeated delay, regulatory change and public scrutiny. Few commercial leaders have run that problem end to end.
Strategic decisions about supply chains, capital allocation, and technology partnerships increasingly rest on assumptions about the US-China relationship that neither side has rigorously examined. Most organisations treat the conflict as a permanent, structurally determined condition – and make significant, often irreversible bets on decoupling, reshoring, or geopolitical alignment on that basis. The harder question – whether the conflict is actually driven by what the prevailing narrative says it is, and whether the forces sustaining it are as immovable as they appear – rarely gets the same rigour as the operational response.
Most large companies treat innovation as theatre. They host hackathons, set up labs, announce partnerships, and run accelerators, ending up with a pipeline of pilots that never reach the P&L. The real problem is converting a corporation’s existing assets into products the market will actually pay for.
Senior leaders are under pressure to make high-stakes decisions in conditions where the available information is abundant, contested, and heavily distorted by media cycles and cognitive shortcuts. Yet the tools required to reason well under uncertainty – probability, causal inference, evidence evaluation – are rarely taught and even more rarely applied systematically inside organisations. The result is that even experienced executives and boards make decisions shaped more by availability bias, narrative pull, and institutional momentum than by the evidence in front of them.
Most leadership teams know the operating environment has shifted. Far fewer have changed how they decide, allocate, or hold their nerve when the assumptions underneath the strategy are moving. The gap between knowing disruption matters and leading through it is where senior teams quietly lose ground.